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Vancomycin-
Resistant 
Enterococci, 
Point Barrow, 
Alaska, USA
To the Editor: An increasing 
number of bacterial infections are 
now difﬁ  cult or impossible to treat (1) 
because of the misuse of antimicro-
bial drugs and the epidemic spread of 
bacterial resistance to these drugs (2). 
The most alarming reports are of me-
thicillin-resistant  Staphylococcus au-
reus, extended-spectrum β-lactamase 
producers, and vancomycin-resistant 
enterococci (VRE). Although knowl-
edge about dissemination mechanisms 
is poor, the spread of resistance clearly 
is not restricted to hospitals but oc-
curs also in the community and in the 
natural environment (3,4). Since the 
1990s, the epidemiology in the United 
States has shifted so that most VRE 
are  Enterococcus faecium. Recent 
studies indicate clonal spread of the 
E. faecium CC17 lineage in clinical 
isolates, exhibiting high-level ampi-
cillin and ﬂ  uoroquinolone  resistance 
and harboring an enterococcal surface 
protein–coding esp gene (5,6).
During a polar research expedi-
tion to the Beringia region in 2005, 
we collected fecal samples from birds 
at sites with no or low human popu-
lation. The aim was to investigate the 
current status of resistance dissemina-
tion into remote areas of the world. 
The study site in Alaska was located 
on the tundra halfway between the 
city of Barrow and Point Barrow, 
the northernmost point of the United 
States (71°23′20″N, 156°28′45″W). 
Fecal samples from glaucous gulls 
(Larus hyperboreus) were enriched 
(18 h at 37°C) in brain–heart infusion 
broth (Becton Dickinson, Franklin 
Lakes, NJ, USA) supplemented with 
aztreonam and vancomycin (10 mg/L 
and 4 mg/L, respectively; ICN Bio-
medicals Inc., Aurora, OH, USA), fol-
lowed by spreading on chromID VRE 
plates (bioMérieux, Marcy l’Etoile, 
France) and incubated for 48 h at 
37°C. Typical colonies were isolated 
and species identiﬁ  ed by biochemical 
testing, including the Phoenix Auto-
mated Microbiology System (Becton 
Dickinson). MIC was determined for 
vancomycin, teicoplanin, ampicillin, 
and ciproﬂ  oxacin by using Etest strips 
(AB Biodisk, Solna, Sweden), and the 
presence of vanA, vanB, and esp genes 
was established by PCR with previ-
ously described primers (7,8) (esp 
primers esp11 and esp12).
Cultures showed 2 isolates of E. 
faecium; MICs for vancomycin and 
teicoplanin were >256 and 96 μg/mL, 
respectively, for both isolates. Geno-
typing determined that they harbored 
vanA. Isolates exhibited high-level am-
picillin and ciproﬂ  oxacin  resistance; 
MICs were >256 and >32 μg mL, re-
spectively for both isolates. They also 
harbored the esp gene. Isolates came 
from 2 of 33 sampled glaucous gulls, a 
species conﬁ  ned to the Arctic regions, 
that have limited southbound migra-
tion during the nonbreeding season.
Clinical isolates of VRE were ﬁ  rst 
found in the late 1980s. In the United 
States, vancomycin was widely used 
in human medicine, and outbreaks oc-
curred in hospitals rather than in the 
community; the opposite was, and is, 
true in Europe. Because of massive use 
of glycopeptide antimicrobial drugs, 
i.e., avoparcin, as growth promoters in 
domestic animal production until the 
mid-1990s, VRE can be found in hos-
pitals and the community (9).
Our  ﬁ   ndings show that bacteria 
resistant to antimicrobial drugs, or re-
sistance genes, already have spread to 
one of the most remote areas of North 
America, Point Barrow, Alaska. This 
spread suggests that few (if any) plac-
es on earth may be protected against 
the spread of such resistance, and the 
dispersal mechanisms are far more ef-
ﬁ   cient than previously thought. Our 
data also place the isolates as part of 
the clinically spread clonal E. fae-
cium CC17 lineage, characterized by 
high-level ampicillin and quinolone 
resistance and harboring the esp gene, 
thus strongly supporting a human ori-
gin. Possible dispersal mechanisms to 
remote areas include stepwise hori-
zontal transfer between migratory and 
nonmigratory bird species and anthro-
pogenic transport.
The increasing evolution and 
spread of antimicrobial drug–resistant 
bacteria and resistance genes seriously 
threaten public health and could esca-
late to catastrophic proportions (1). 
Bacteria and drug resistance are eas-
ily transferred between humans and 
animals and consequently between 
the environment and clinical settings. 
Much remains to be learned about the 
effect of human-associated changes of 
natural ecosystems on the total effect 
of resistance. Therefore, our ﬁ  nding of 
VRE at Point Barrow is important to 
recognize. Decisive action is needed 
to establish efﬁ  cient monitoring pro-
grams that include not only surveil-
lance and control of clinical bacterial 
resistance but also environmental lev-
els of resistance.
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Use of Templates 
to Identify Source 
of Norovirus 
Outbreak
To the Editor: On November 
22, 2006, an infection control nurse 
notiﬁ  ed the Marion County (Oregon) 
Health Department about acute gas-
troenteritis among persons who had 
attended a reception at a medical fa-
cility on November 16, 2006. With a 
holiday weekend only hours away, the 
county health department asked the 
state health department to join the out-
break investigation. 
After interviewing the caterer, 
organizers, and several attendees, we 
modiﬁ  ed a questionnaire template to 
reﬂ  ect potential exposures. Using this 
questionnaire, we conducted a retro-
spective cohort study by telephone 
among reception attendees identiﬁ  ed 
from a ticket list. We deﬁ  ned a case 
of acute gastroenteritis as reported 
vomiting or diarrhea (>3 loose stools 
within a 24-hour period) within 18–72 
hours of the event.
Sanitarians inspected the facility 
and the caterer’s kitchen. We traced 
implicated oysters (the source of the 
outbreak) through distribution re-
cords; screened stool specimens for 
norovirus by RT-PCR; tested oysters 
from the implicated lot for norovirus 
by qRT-PCR; entered data into a cus-
tom outbreak database template; cal-
culated relative risks (RRs) and 95% 
conﬁ  dence intervals (CIs) using Epi 
Info (www.cdc.gov/epiinfo); and as-
sessed the signiﬁ  cance of the associa-
tion between acute gastroenteritis and 
consumption of implicated oysters by 
the χ2 or Fisher exact test.
Approximately 200 persons at-
tended the reception. We called all 
households on the reception ticket 
list with identiﬁ  able phone numbers 
and reached a convenience sample of 
66 attendees from 50 households. We 
determined that 10 had cases of acute 
gastroenteritis, 53 had no symptoms, 
and 3 (who were excluded from the 
analysis) had minor symptoms. The 
median incubation period was 36 
hours (range 31–63 hours). None of 
the 10 attendees with acute gastroen-
teritis sought medical attention; stool 
specimens from 2 of them tested 
positive for norovirus (1 positive for 
genogroup II and 1 positive for both 
I and II).
Illness was associated with con-
sumption of raw oysters on the half 
shell (RR 11.8; 95% CI 2.8–50; p = 
0.0001), which was reported by 8 of 
the 10 attendees with acute gastro-
enteritis. No other foods were as-
sociated with illness. No signiﬁ  cant 
breaches in food-handling procedures 
were identiﬁ  ed. The only food handler 
who reported illness had eaten several 
oysters at the event and became ill 36 
hours later.
The oysters had been individu-
ally quick frozen on the half shell and 
packed loosely in cartons after being 
harvested in South Korea by growers 
approved by the US Food and Drug 
Administration. For the reception, a 
single 6-kg box of oysters was thawed 
and served raw. The box was from a 
shipment of 2,200 boxes legally im-
ported in October 2006. Boxes from 
the same shipment had been distrib-
uted to 5 states. Oysters from 4 other 
cartons were consumed (some cooked) 
at 2 other Oregon locations. Public 
health ofﬁ  cials in other states were no-
tiﬁ  ed and asked to report any related 
illnesses; none were identiﬁ  ed.
Noroviruses (genogroups I and II) 
were detected in oysters from an intact 
carton of the implicated lot. Sequenc-
ing was not attempted. The implicated 
lot was voluntarily recalled by the na-
tional distributor; most of the lot was 
embargoed or recalled before the oys-
ters were consumed.
Oysters are a recurrent source of 
outbreaks and sporadic cases of no-
rovirus infection, vibriosis, and other 
infections (1) because they are fre-
quently eaten raw or undercooked (2). 
Microbial monitoring of oyster harvest 
  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 15, No. 5, May 2009  839 